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Research Question
> What different types of populist communication styles emerged 
during the 2014 European Parliament elections,
and under which conditions did political parties select specific 
populist communication styles?
This study was created in the context of the research project “The role of national parties in the 
politicization of EU integration” and supported by the German Research Foundation DFG under 
grant 10017E and the Swiss National Science Foundation SNF under grant 144592/1. 
Definition
the elites
the 
people
the 
others
inclusive / exclusive
an
ti-
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t
> 3 components:
— alleged proximity to and 
identification with the population
appeal to the people
— criticism of and distrust                   
in the (political) elites 
elite-critique
— ostracism of ‚the others‘
exclusion
anti-elitist populism full populism
empty populism excluding populism
> Populism as a political communication style
— following Jagers & Walgrave (2007)
the 
elites
the 
people
the 
others
an
ti-
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t
exclusion
> Euroscepticism provides a favourable environment for populism
> activated issues within the
Eurosceptic discourse:
— democratic deficit of the EU
— distance citizens – EU-elites 
— bureaucracy of institutions
— free movement of persons
— EU accession negotiations
European Context
Left-right ideologie and EU position in 1999 (EU 15) 
Source: Ray (2007)
Assumption
Euroscepticism
H1: 
> Parties settled either on the right or the left pole of the traditional        
political spectrum use more populist communication styles than 
mainstream parties.
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• market-liberal nature of the EU
➤ critique of economic elites
(e.g .Bartolini 2005; Heine 2010; Hooghe et al. 2002; 
Reungoat 2010; Scharpf 1996, 1999)
European Context II
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• democratic deficit of the EU
• bureaucracy and corruption
➤ critique of political elites
cu
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on • opposition to 
- (more) immigration
- free movement of persons
- prospective enlargement
➤ exclusion of others
(e.g. Betz 1994; Börzel & Risse 2000; Hooghe et al. 2002; 
Kitschelt 1995; Risse-Kappen 1996; Taggart 1998)
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• market-liberal nature of the EU
➤ critique of economic elites
(e.g .Bartolini 2005; Heine 2010; Hooghe et al. 2002; 
Reungoat 2010; Scharpf 1996, 1999)
Assumption
Euroscepticism and Party Ideology
H2: 
> In addition to the classical anti-elitist type of populism, right-wing 
Eurosceptic parties apply the element of exclusion more visibly                 
(i.e. an exclusive or full type of populism). 
> transnational nature of the EU
è national and European level
> question of identity perception
> representation of identity 
perceptions:
— inclusive European identity
mainstream parties
left-wing parties
— exclusive national identity
right-wing partiesnationEuropeans
European Context III
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hostility to EU institutions
(McLaren 2007)
Assumption
Party Ideology
H3: 
> People references of right-wing Eurosceptic parties are mostly directed to 
their own national community and their elite critique is predominantly        
directed at the EU elites. 
Assumption
Government Participation
> Populist parties tone down their messages and become more     
responsible when presumably or effectively in power. 
(Kriesi & Pappas 2015)
> governing parties are the (national) establishment
H4: 
> Parties in government use less populism in general, and in particular they 
apply significantly less criticism on the national elites than parties without 
government participation.
Assumption
Affectedness by Crisis
> economic and political crises reinforce populism
(e.g. Knight 1998, Kriesi & Pappas 2015)
> crisis intensifies feelings of ostracism and exclusion
(e.g. Hartleb 2012)
> crisis generates nationalism
(e.g. Brubaker 2011)
H5: 
> Parties in countries heavily affected by the sovereign debt crisis              
use more populism in their party communication. 
In particular they use the exclusive element more visibly and predominantly 
appeal to the national community compared to parties that are only mildly 
affected by the sovereign debt crisis.
Procedure
Austria, Germany, France, Greece
> quantitative content analysis of press releases
— all political parties that reached more than 3% 
in the last elections
— Europ* / europ* / EU and relevant acronyms (2x)
— 12 weeks prior to the 2014 EP elections
> 1 Greek, 3 German, 2 French coders
> indices for degree, type and level of populism 
for each of the 28 parties
> linear OLS regressions
elite 
critique
people 
reference exclusion
German French Greek
peopref 0.91 0.85 0.93
antiestab 0.76 0.76 0.73
exclusion 0.64 0.84 0.87
Krippendorff's α
national community
exclusive
critique on 
national elites
critique on
EU elites
fringe  
(Eurosceptic)
right-wing
crisis
government
H5
Results
Drivers of Populism
✓
H2
H1
H3
H4
24.48*
.62
N=28 parties; linear OLS regressions: numbers besides arrows indicate non-standardized regression coefficients; numbers near
boxes indicate explained variances; all regressions have high tolerance values (>40) and low values for VIF (<2.5), indicating that
severe multicollinearity effects are not present; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
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Dependent Variables
POPULISM
national community
critique on 
national elites
critique on
EU elites
POPULISM
crisis
government
H5
Results
Drivers of Populism
H1
H3
H4
N=28 parties; linear OLS regressions: numbers besides arrows indicate non-standardized regression coefficients; numbers near
boxes indicate explained variances; all regressions have high tolerance values (>40) and low values for VIF (<2.5), indicating that
severe multicollinearity effects are not present; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
fringe  
(Eurosceptic)
✓H2
exclusive
right-wing
5.429***
.65
Dependent Variables
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POPULISM
crisis
government
H5
Results
Drivers of Populism
H2
H1
H4
N=28 parties; linear OLS regressions: numbers besides arrows indicate non-standardized regression coefficients; numbers near
boxes indicate explained variances; all regressions have high tolerance values (>40) and low values for VIF (<2.5), indicating that
severe multicollinearity effects are not present; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
fringe  
(Eurosceptic)
national community
critique on
EU elites
right-wing
H3 24.85***
-5.004
~
.15
.63✗
Dependent Variables
national community
exclusive
critique on
EU elites
right-wing
crisisH5
Results
Drivers of Populism
H2
H1
H3
N=28 parties; linear OLS regressions: numbers besides arrows indicate non-standardized regression coefficients; numbers near
boxes indicate explained variances; all regressions have high tolerance values (>40) and low values for VIF (<2.5), indicating that
severe multicollinearity effects are not present; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
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Results
Drivers of Populism
H2
H1
H3
H4
N=28 parties; linear OLS regressions: numbers besides arrows indicate non-standardized regression coefficients; numbers near
boxes indicate explained variances; all regressions have high tolerance values (>40) and low values for VIF (<2.5), indicating that
severe multicollinearity effects are not present; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
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Dependent Variables
national community
exclusive
POPULISM
crisisH5
✗
21.66***
20.91***
-2.048***
~
.63
.65
.62
Conclusion
> Right-wing parties use a specific populist communication style:
— full populism
(anti-elitist & excluding elements)
— nationally-oriented populism
(appeals to the national community) 
è Can the success of right-wing populist parties in Europe be explained by their 
exclusive and national populist communication styles?
> The exclusive element in general is applied very rarely… 
… and not used more often within a crisis-ridden environment.
> Parties in crisis-hit countries have a strong national focus when applying populist 
communication styles.
è How are the parties’ populist communication styles reflected by the media?
è What effects have these populist communication styles on vote intention?
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